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Introduction
The Christian minority of the population in sixteenth-century Rome who were of 
Iberian Jewish origin constituted a notable presence in the city.1 Part of that minority 
was also involved in the circuits formed around the issue of apostolic letters and the 
parallel phenomenon of alienation and commodification of ecclesiastical benefices.
Many converso families, traditionally dedicated to tax farming in the Iberian 
monarchies, found in the Roman Curia the center of the largest income market 
in the ecclesiastical world: that of commerce through the issue of benefices. For 
some other conversos, the Roman provision of benefices represented not only the 
possibility of accumulating considerable income but also an alternative path to their 
integration and social advancement. In addition the companies and transnational 
networks of merchant bankers were essential for the proper functioning of a system 
in which instruments of credit and circuits of information were essential. All these 
factors made some conversos from Portugal and Spain excellent candidates for 
managing these curial affairs, either as brokers hired by individuals or as servants of 
the Catholic monarchy. This paper focuses on the latter.
Despite the image to the contrary that we could have, during the rule of 
monarchs such as Philip II of Spain (r. 1556–1598), many individuals whose Jewish 
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ancestry was well known to the Crown were procured and contracted as royal agents 
for the Curia. The families of these men, in many cases, eventually joined not only 
the elites of their kingdoms of origin but also the Spanish, Portuguese, and even 
Italian nobility—in some cases, in a very short period of time. 
We know almost nothing about this network of agencies. A thorough 
examination of what we do know would surpass the objectives of this paper, but a 
different perspective, that of the many conversos who acted as agents, may serve as 
a representative example for analyzing their functions and evolution in the period 
under study: 1550–1650.
Certainly the new curial dynamics in which these agents appeared began earlier, 
between the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, in parallel with the full 
development of a papal “spiritual” taxation (fiscalità spirituale) with roots in the 
fourteenth century. However, it was in the second half of the sixteenth century that 
these agents became well defined, as we shall see. The system would go into decline 
a century later, with the loss of the Netherlands and the Italian territories. These 
years also include the Iberian Union under the Habsburg dynasty (1580–1640), 
which allows us to see the operation of Portuguese businesses—and Portuguese 
New Christians—within a system controlled by Spain.
A Complex Curial  Market
The development by the Holy See of financial needs similar to those of other early 
modern states brought with it the papacy’s increased “fiscalization” of the enormous 
body of ecclesiastical revenues that formed the system of benefices, which most 
notably affected the Iberian monarchies.2
The benefice—that is, the income linked to all ecclesiastical offices—was the 
basis for the financial support of the secular clergy (diocesan priests) in the Ancien 
Régime.3 With its origins in the Middle Ages, until the fourteenth century it seems 
to have worked without the Holy See interfering in the dynamic of the selection 
of priests. Afterward, however, the situation moved toward greater control by the 
papacy, a process that culminated in the sixteenth century.4
The invention of the juridical figure of the papal reserve, which made the pope 
the last holder of all the benefices—dominus beneficiorum—became the key to 
making this possible. Through it the pope reserved for himself the ultimate right 
over all ecclesiastical benefices, hence the ability to dispose of their succession and 
provision even when they were legitimately occupied, dispensing the necessary 
canonical requirements—even, in fact, transferring their ownership. The door 
was thus opened to the possibility of accommodating those who had the financial 
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capacity to obtain the bulls. They could circumvent the established route of the 
normal provision of benefices by means such as resignations (resignatio in favorem 
tertii) or coadjutorships with the right of succession.
We must add to this the large percentage of benefices the papacy was able to 
reserve in cases of vacancy by death of the owner. For the so-called alternative, only 
the benefices of free collation that would be vacant in the months of March, June, 
September, and December were reserved for the ordinary authority (usually the 
bishop and, to varying degrees according to the diocese, the cathedral chapter or 
another ecclesiastical body).5 The other eight were apostolic months, that is, the 
choice fell to the pope, and for its effective provision it was necessary to pay for the 
costs of the respective apostolic letter.
Regardless of how it was accessed, the receiver of a benefice had to meet certain 
canonical requirements: he had to be of a minimum age, be of legitimate birth, 
and receive holy orders (and in some cases have academic degrees). In addition 
the benefice could not be given to those convicted of matters of faith, nor could 
recipients simultaneously hold two benefices with care of souls. These were all 
requirements so that dispensation could only be obtained in the Roman Curia. 
Pluralism, that is the accumulation of benefices, which sometimes took the form of 
dozens of them in the hands of a single cleric, was in fact common at the time.
In practice Rome had created a genuine transnational market around the issue 
of apostolic letters (provision of benefices, dispensations of all kinds, and the like). 
Obviously, this market worked as well as it did because it was of benefit not only to 
the papal coffers: there were local interests, urban elites, and intermediate groups 
on the rise in the Iberian Peninsula. The phenomenon of the patrimonialization of 
ecclesiastical benefices by certain families did not depend solely on the possibilities 
offered by Rome, but they most certainly facilitated it. There were also networks of 
brokers, individuals knowledgeable about the inner workings of this market. The 
curial practice was intertwined, and it is not surprising to find that some of these 
experts wrote guides for dealing with benefices and dispensations, containing tables 
of values and taxes, advice about the use of information, and so on.
The Network of Curial  Agencies of the Hispanic Monarchy
In the case of the Iberian Peninsula, there was a huge volume of ecclesiastical 
benefices whose provision could depend on the issuance of an apostolic letter. 
Some of them were under royal patronage: the presentation for all the bishoprics, 
every benefice in the Indies, the Canary Islands, the Kingdom of Granada, and 
a not inconsiderable number in the rest of the Iberian Peninsula, Italy, and the 
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Netherlands. The transmission of an important part of the ecclesiastical incomes 
of the Spanish and Portuguese empires depended on a complex negotiation with 
the curial system.6 To this we must add the thousands of dispensations the Curia 
issued to these realms each year and for different reasons, the taxation of pensions 
on bishoprics and other benefices, and so on.
The intense traffic of applications required fine connoisseurs of the uses 
and mechanics of the Apostolic Dataria. They were dispatchers who were stably 
employed and credited as ordinary diplomatic agents of the Crown, so that they 
could deal directly, on the king’s behalf, with the pope, the datary (datarius), and 
other officials of the Curia.
Someone práctico en Roma (the common expression in sources of the period)—in 
other words the person who could deal with curial affairs diligently and skillfully—
was always sought, acting also as an informant at the papal court. Thus, between 
the ambassador and the different agents, the Spanish monarchy maintained several 
channels of simultaneous communication, ensuring that it would receive as much 
information as possible. The correspondence sent to Madrid is quite repetitive, and 
there are plenty of duplicate copies of letters, which displays the zeal of the agents 
in avoiding any loss of news. 
The Spanish Crown used a system that reflected its supranational nature. 
This system consisted of several specialized representatives residing in Rome as 
the functional support for the protection and realization of the Crown’s interests 
in this regard. Among their other functions, they were basically procurators of 
the ecclesiastical patronage of the Catholic monarch as a sovereign of different 
territories. It was a composite system for a composite monarchy.
The king appointed a general agent who was, in theory, dependent on the 
Council of State. His responsibility was the curial business related to Castile, the 
West Indies, the Inquisition, and the Bull of the Crusade (one of the most important 
revenues of the Crown, by papal concession, periodically negotiated), as well as any 
other requirements of the monarchy’s governing bodies. As Rafael Olaechea has 
written:
Rome was the only court where the Spanish monarch sent two delegates; one, the 
ambassador, minister or plenipotentiary, represented the king before the ruler of 
the Papal States; the other, the general agent of prayers or petitions, represented 
the Catholic prince before the visible head of the church. This duality that, at 
first glance, may seem strange, is not a whim of historians. The pontiff himself 
understood it in this way and countersigned it. It was in this way that the first [the 
ambassador] was received by the pope with a specific protocol and ceremony, and 
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they both dealt with political and religious matters. The second [the general agent] 
had the doors of the Roman court open to him—especially those of the Dataria and 
the Chancellery—where all sorts of ecclesiastical matters were handled, from the 
dispensation of a marriage between first cousins, to the erection of a new diocese, 
through thousands of pardons, supplications, and provisions related to benefices.7
In 1563 Ambassador Luis de Requesens pointed out the need for the services of 
the Catalan Francisco Robuster as a general agent in the Roman Curia, given the 
insufficient experience of the staff in the Spanish embassy. He also recommended 
hiring a second person, since the sheer volume of existing businesses that Robuster 
dealt with on his own meant a work overload for him.8
We know this general agent’s role during the late seventeenth through the 
second half of the eighteenth centuries through Rafael Olaechea’s and Maximiliano 
Barrio Gozalo’s studies. They are exceptional contributions to the understanding of 
a hitherto-neglected early modern period political apparatus.9 At this point in time, 
we know little or nothing about the rest of the network of agencies, despite the 
abundant documentation preserved.10
If the affairs of Castile, the Indies, and others of a nonterritorial nature were the 
responsibility of the general agent, those concerning other kingdoms and states of 
the Catholic monarchy were dealt with by specific agents: there was an agency for 
the Crown of Aragon, one for the Kingdom of Naples, one for the Duchy of Milan, 
one for the Kingdom of Sicily, and another for the Spanish Low Countries and 
Franche-Comté. Agents often came from the patronage networks of each viceroy 
or governor, who chose them. Portugal, meanwhile, would be added to this system 
in the 1580s, maintaining the strong political character of its representatives in the 
Curia.
In any case the system could accommodate the need for flexibility: the same 
individual could be responsible for several agencies at the same time. Some agencies 
could also be temporarily suppressed in favor of the general agency of Spain.
Many conversos fulfilled these duties in the service of the Spanish Habsburgs 
between 1550 and 1650. Obviously, not all the agents were New Christians, but 
their number in the period under consideration here was of an extraordinarily 
significant proportion, given that we are speaking of a social minority. For example, 
in the agency of Portugal, at least one third of the agents appointed by the Crown 
had Jewish ancestry. In the case of the Italian agencies, 45 percent of the agents 
we know of were New Christians. Even more interesting is the fact that conversos 
were used more frequently in these agencies: 53 percent of nominations as agents 
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of Sicily, Naples, or Milan were made in favor of New Christians such as Andrés 
Vela, Ferrante de Torres, Juan Rubio de Herrera, Alonso de la Torre y Berna, and 
Juan de Córdoba.
The Crown’s use of agents who were known to be of Jewish descent was 
repeated and conscious. It was not a rare phenomenon; rather it is an example of the 
ambivalence governing the relations between the Iberian monarchies and the New 
Christian minority during this era. In the search for appropriate representatives in 
the Roman Curia, efficacy prevailed over genealogy, and many conversos showed 
that they could provide the most efficient services.11
Problems arose, however, when these agents tried to use their position to force 
entry (for themselves or their families) into institutions with statutes of purity of 
blood, most notably, cathedral chapters. Given the strong legitimating power of 
these bodies of the Iberian local elites, it was a tactic that allowed them to clear 
the family name—if they could manage to pass through that filter, using whatever 
means they could. However, the application of the statute could be rigorous if the 
chapter in question or a decisive part of its members were so inclined. To do so was 
risky, as it could publicly expose the “stain” that had been conveniently concealed. 
This was a common element in all the cases of converso agents known to me.
From the reign of the Catholic Monarchs onward, procurators and special 
agents were used.12 In the 1520s the first fixed agents appeared on the scene, but it 
was during the reign of Philip II that this agency system was formally structured. 
The early years of the embassy of Don Luis de Requesens, who was very critical of 
the previous performance of various curial agents, are a clear display of the policy 
of the Catholic monarchy toward achieving a network that was subordinate to the 
opinion of the embassy.
The Embassy of Requesens:  The Case of Andrés Vela and the Weaknesses of the System
Andrés Vela (ca. 1516–1567) exemplifies the figure of the mid-sixteenth-century 
curial agent whose influence others would attempt to curb in the 1560s. A converso 
churchman who immigrated to Rome, he was propelled to a prominent position 
in the papal court and enriched by the speculation in benefices. He was a shrewd 
connoisseur of the Dataria’s mechanisms. The position of such individuals attracted 
the Crown, which could count on their services. Their excessive independence and 
the vested interest they so overtly flaunted were, however, at the root of the problem 
with them.
Coming from a family of Andalusian Jews converted to Christianity in 1492, 
Vela went to Rome in his youth, where I have been able to document his presence 
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from the pontificate of Paul III (1534–1549) onward. In Rome he began dealing 
in the market of ecclesiastical benefices and soon became a courtier and familiar of 
the pope. By 1542 he was a knight of Saint Peter, a venal title of knighthood of a 
papal military order that he must have acquired a little earlier.13 Later he obtained 
the office of prothonotary.
To be a member of the papal family (the close circle of direct servants), a curial 
officer, and a knight of Saint Peter were clear advantages to those involved in the 
business of ecclesiastical benefices and the management of apostolic letters. The 
abundance of prothonotaries, referendaries, notaries of the Apostolic Camera, and 
cubicularii or camerarii (that is, stewards) among those who accumulated benefices 
and were speculators in this market is therefore not surprising. These offices were 
also venal. Their high price, however, made it necessary to resort to capital from 
the societates officiorum, companies formed by various investors for the purchase of 
offices that were held by a single individual who held the title.14 
It was in the 1550s that Andrés Vela began to make a name for himself in Rome. 
An increase in the number of transactions involving ecclesiastical benefices that 
passed through his hands can be observed in the Vatican archival documentation. 
This earned him a remarkable level of income, through ecclesiastical pensions 
and benefices, plus valuable experience in the curial mechanisms. His position 
in the papal court rose in those years: he had been papal squire under Paul IV 
(1555–1559), but it would be under Paul’s successor, Pius IV (1559–1565), that 
he reached his greatest influence as the pope’s private camerarius (chamberlain) and 
his person of trust.15
His name is cited in the correspondence of Ambassador Diego Hurtado 
de Mendoza in 1552, though it is unclear when he began to be counted on as an 
ordinary agent.16 His career in the service of the Crown probably began under the 
reign of Philip II, thanks to the recommendation of the Duke of Sessa, Don Gonzalo 
Fernández de Córdoba, with whom he maintained a close relationship of patronage.
The patronage link between the Salazar family, of which Andrés Vela was 
a member, and this branch of the Fernández de Córdobas, Counts of Cabra and 
Dukes of Sessa and Baena, had been forged at least one or two generations earlier. 
For example, Andrés Vela’s mother, Leonor de Salazar, had served in the court of the 
Countess of Cabra, the duke’s grandmother.17 Following the appointment of Don 
Gonzalo Fernández de Córdoba in 1558 as governor of Milan, Vela begins to appear 
in the documentation as an agent in Rome for the affairs of the duchy. In fact, on 
August 18, 1559, he was a witness to the presentation of the body of Paul IV, which 
he reported by letter to Philip II, conveying to him the events and people’s reactions.18 
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In March 1563 Don Luis Dávila, grand commander of the Order of Alcántara, 
came to Italy as a special representative of Philip II to the pope for matters relating 
to the Council of Trent. Simultaneously, Fernández de Córdoba had been appointed 
to a second term in Milan, during which he made Andrés Vela an agent in the 
Curia. In September of that same year, Luis de Requesens made his official entry 
into Rome as the Catholic monarchy’s ambassador. The problems for many Spanish 
curial agents were not long in coming.
Upon his arrival, Requesens received a secret report from the hands of Dávila, 
who was preparing to return to Spain a few days later. His mission in the court seems 
not to have been confined to dealing with the council. The grand commander of 
Alcántara had drafted, along with the outgoing ambassador, Francisco de Vargas, a 
series of recommendations to strengthen the control and authority of the embassy. 
One of the proposed measures was to have a number of Spaniards leave Rome, by 
any means. Among these Spaniards were the curial agents of Milan and Naples.
For Requesens the need for changes in the network of agencies, leading to 
a system subordinate to the embassy and not parallel to it, was evident. Several 
of these agents had demonstrated excessive ambition, using their posts without 
informing the embassy of their actions, when they were not actively working for 
their own advantage.
And although this has not happened under me, and I will work so that it does 
not, nonetheless I cannot impose myself on them, for in doing as they wish they 
do not overstep themselves, and this has been a cut vein for several ministers in 
the past, which made them lose some of their authority. I believe that it would be 
convenient to get rid of some of them, especially the agent of Milan, Andrés Vela, 
one of those [mentioned] in the memorial by the Commander of Alcántara, and 
that the viceroys should transmit all the information to the ambassador and that 
he have solicitors of his own choosing so that under his orders they can request 
what is necessary for each kingdom or state. In so doing I assure you things would 
be better managed.19 
The main obstacle to the imposition of these measures was the closeness of several 
individuals to the pope. According to the report, it was best to remove them from 
Rome. Andrés Vela appeared to be unapproachable directly, given his position in 
the inner circle of the pontiff; his sudden disappearance could lead to tensions with 
the Holy See. The honor of the Duke of Sessa, his protector, also had to be dealt 
with tactfully. So, with the consent of the king, they opted for a strategy that would 
combine a decisive effect and an indirect action.
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On October 23, 1563, Requesens wrote to Sessa, warning him about the 
“negative opinion among everyone” regarding the agent of Milan and the existence 
of instructions in the embassy that he be made to leave Rome along with the agent 
of Naples and other Spaniards.20 
One night soon after, he ordered the kidnapping of Álvaro Esquivel who, 
after being held for eight days in the embassy, was sent to Spanish territory in a 
frigate.21 Álvaro Esquivel was one of the elements in the report, but unlike Vela 
and others, his position was more fragile, as he held no official post in the Curia, 
nor was he an agent of the Crown. In an encrypted letter dated November 13, 
1563, Requesens informed the king of the success of the operation. Though there 
had been murmuring and apparently some witnesses, Requesens thought that the 
best path to follow was to deny everything. Resorting to bribery to shut mouths 
was not believed necessary, as they had accomplished what they wanted: nobody 
had evidence regarding responsibility for the kidnapping, although everyone, from 
Andrés Vela to the pope himself, knew now about the embassy’s expeditious ways 
of going about things. 
On December 18 Philip II wrote to Sessa ordering him to dismiss Vela, “who is 
one of the main members of a group of tricksters among some Spaniards in Rome,” 
and indicating the new line to follow thereafter in the choice of a curial agent for 
Spanish Milan:
He [the prospective agent] must possess all the good qualities that you see are 
required and must not be given more than two hundred ducats as has always 
been stipulated, ordering expressly that he not deal with matters on his own with 
the pope, cardinals, nor any other person, but that he be dealt with by the grand 
commander of Castile, who is my current ambassador, or whoever is in Rome at the 
time, and let him deal with these matters in order that only he or the people that 
depend on him decide and that nothing be done that is not known to or ordered by 
my ambassador because it so suits my service and the authority and reputation of 
that office, and the matters themselves and their proper issuing and management.22 
On January 4, 1564, Sessa responded to the king by letter regarding the charges 
against Vela, which were the fruit, according to him, of the passions that any man of 
his privileged position in the papal court could arouse. It was this position that, in 
his opinion, would make of him a suitable choice as an agent, a post in which had 
served diligently. In recent months, and under his express orders, Sessa informed 
the king, Vela had taken fewer liberties, following the lines desired by the new 
ambassador, who apparently tried to compromise.
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After Esquivel’s kidnapping, however, the message had become abundantly 
clear. Following that event, Andrés Vela had asked Sessa for permission to retire 
to Córdoba, in the cathedral of which he had obtained a canonry (not without 
problems on account of the purity of blood statute).23 It was, as the duke himself 
explained to the king, the best possible solution for the honor of this agent, who 
would leave an office without public affront, “which may be allotted as Your Majesty 
sees fit.”24
Other Spanish curial agents handled business as well. The Torres family, also 
of the same Andalusian Jewish origin as Andrés Vela, exemplifies the adaptation 
to the new forms. Inquisitorial pressure seems to have led Don Luis de Torres Sr. 
from his native Malaga to Rome in the first half of the sixteenth century.25 In the 
same month (October 1563) that the events described above unfolded, his nephew, 
Don Luis de Torres Jr., wrote to Philip II. In the letter he recalled the good services 
rendered by both his uncle and himself in the execution of curial matters. With this 
letter the family expressly reiterated its loyalty and willingness to serve the Crown 
in the papal court in the future.26 Not only were the Torreses not dismissed but in 
the 1570s the agency of Naples was confided to Fernando de Torres, Don Luis’s 
brother.27 
The case of Andrés Vela illustrates the desire of the Crown to have better 
control of their multiple agents. These, however, maintained a direct channel of 
correspondence with the monarch for instructions, lines of credit, and so on. They 
continually informed Madrid about events, over and above their role as expediters. 
Some even made it a point to locate relics, archaeological remains, artwork, or 
specific artists for the Spanish court.28 
Doctor Juan Rubio de Herrera is an example of the variety of parallel functions 
that were developed by some agents. An Andalusian cleric of Jewish origin, he was 
known at the court of Madrid for his work as a provider of artwork, relics, and 
ruins.29 Following the usual strategy, he brought his nephew, Juan de Córdoba, to 
Rome, where he taught him everything he needed to know to succeed as a curial 
agent and a dealer in artwork. Moreover, the nephew came to play an important 
role in this field, thanks to his close friendship with the painter Diego Velázquez.30 
The position at the papal court and the experience in negotiating ecclesiastical 
benefices enjoyed by Juan Rubio de Herrera was, as in other cases, key to the Crown 
entrusting him with the responsibility of obtaining apostolic letters and other 
related matters. The logical preference of the Crown for especially efficient and 
loyal agents was sometimes reflected in their performance of their duties for very 
long periods (the converso José Pinto Pereira, with twenty-nine years of service as an 
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agent of Portugal, is a striking example).31 It was also evinced in the accumulation of 
several agencies by one person, like Rubio de Herrera, who simultaneously held three: 
those of Naples, Sicily, and Milan. A key to his success in business was, in addition 
to his expertise in the Dataria, his friendship with Ferdinando Brandani (the Italian 
name of the Portuguese converso Fernando Brandão), the most powerful man in the 
Dataria, after the subdatario, as the prefect in charge of the compositiones.32 Until the 
subdatario’s execution for corruption and Brandão’s disgrace,this nexus constituted 
a major source of social capital that Rubio de Herrera not only exploited but also 
managed to convey to his nephew, who succeeded him in the agency of Naples 
in 1641.33 Today a reflection of these ties is the portrait that Velázquez, during his 
stay in Rome, painted of Brandão.34 
The Pintos and the Agency of Por tugal
Prior to the advent of the House of Austria in Portugal, there did not seem to have 
been a stable figure comparable to that of the general agent of Spain for the business 
of issuing apostolic letters. The most important issuances were the responsibility of 
either the ambassador in Rome or a procurator expressly hired for the task.
Among the agreements reached in the Cortes of Tomar in 1581 to ensure his 
acceptance as king of Portugal, Philip II promised to keep Portuguese diplomatic 
agents in most important embassies, including that of Rome.35 The preserved 
correspondence between these agents demonstrates that, for at least two reasons, 
they rapidly became the kind of curial agents who already had dealings with the 
Catholic monarchy: first, the policy centralizing diplomatic relations of all territories 
under Spanish sovereignty in the person of the ambassador of Spain, and second, 
in this connection, a greater integration of the Portuguese community into the 
nationes Hispaniae present in Rome was sought, claiming to give them a single voice 
and visible head. This would be a source of internal conflict during the six decades 
of political union.
On the one hand, the Crown knew from experience the damages that resulted 
from maintaining autonomous agents, who were minor and poorly controlled. It 
was a problem they had tried to remedy in the 1560s and did not wish to repeat 
twenty years later. Consequently, the ambassadors’ policy was almost always to try 
to keep Portugal’s agent subordinated, limiting his functions to negotiating the 
issuance of apostolic letters, as an element within the agency system. There was also 
a call for an outright abolition of the office.36 
On the other hand, as Gaetano Sabatini has analyzed, throughout this period the 
Portuguese community around the national church of Sant’Antonio dei Portoghesi 
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was the source of constant confrontation with this line of action, not only refusing 
to recognize the Spanish ambassador as its protector and natural representative 
but de facto granting this role to the agent of Portugal. The election in 1630 of an 
ambassador of Portuguese origin, Don Manuel de Moura Corte-Real, the Marquis of 
Castel Rodrigo, only exacerbated the problem, contrary to what one might think.37 
With the Iberian Union, the newly created agency of Portugal was entrusted 
to the then secretary of the embassy in Rome, Doctor António Pinto. Pinto was a 
confidant of Lourenço Pires de Távora, Portuguese ambassador to the Holy See, 
who had called him to Rome.
The client-patron relationship between the Pintos and the Távora family was of 
long standing. The secretary’s grandparents, Doctor Moisés de Valencia (baptized in 
Portugal as António de Valença) and his wife, Francisca de Valencia, both Jews from 
Zamora, had entered the service of the powerful Portuguese lineage after leaving 
Castile in 1492.38 
António Pinto immediately saw in the new dynasty an opportunity for his 
family. In 1580 he appeared in Badajoz, Spain, to receive Philip II on his way to 
Portugal and to offer his loyalty and services in Rome.39 Pinto would serve as an 
agent for the next eight years, after which his nephew, Francisco Vaz Pinto, would 
succeed him. The nephew had previously been called to Rome by his uncle to be 
trained as a suitable substitute. The Crown accepted his offer in 1588. The Count 
of Olivares, Spanish ambassador in Rome, made this known in a December 1588 
letter to the king:
Doctor António Pinto left here on November 30, and I cannot but testify to 
Your Majesty that here he has served with much love and rectitude and with 
great understanding of the business at hand, with great experience in expediting 
documents, having also helped me and worked hard at the matters that pertained to 
the responsibilities of my office. . . . The licenciado Francisco Baez [Vaz] Pinto (to 
whom he leaves this office and the other matters according to Your Majesty’s will) 
has been here with him, and even though a few days do not suffice to form a correct 
judgement of someone, my favorable opinion of him has not diminished even in the 
few days after his [António’s] departure, and the same discipline can be seen in him 
as that which existed in his uncle.40 
The Crown’s favor to the Pintos, both uncle and nephew, was based on their 
efficacious work, as well as on their coordination with the Spanish embassy,  a key 
goal from the time of Philip II’s reign onward, as we have seen. Francisco Vaz Pinto 
worked as an agent of Portugal in Rome for eleven years, and his replacement came 
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in 1599 along with the change of government. The Pinto lineage would, however, 
be linked to the Portuguese agency through people like Francisco Pereira Pinto, 
agent from 1610 to 1615,41 and Doctor José Pinto Pereira, whom the House of 
Braganza maintained in place for almost three decades.42 
The Crown greatly valued expertise in these matters. The possibility of the 
transmission of this experience from an agent to a candidate in training from within 
the family partly explains the repeated appearance of brothers, uncles, and nephews 
in the agency network. Operation of this network was subject to less change when 
an agent trained someone: experience was accumulated and with it the potential 
efficiency in the execution of business.
Final Thoughts
The presence of conversos in the network of curial agents is a reflection of the 
importance they had in Rome and in the business of issuing of apostolic letters. 
Considering the great proportional weight that the Iberian Peninsula seems to have 
had in the application for ecclesiastical benefices and dispensations within Catholic 
Europe, the significance of the Spanish-Portuguese conversos in curial circuits is not 
strange, nor is their repeated appearance as part of the network of agents deployed 
by the Catholic monarchy.43 It is useful, however, to emphasize this function in 
contrast to preconceived ideas.
The factors that made the Curia attractive to conversos likewise explain both 
the reason the Crown chose many of them as agents and the problem—never 
fully resolved—associated with them (their conflict of interest). The market that 
developed around the issue of apostolic letters was an open path to enrichment 
(through speculation with ecclesiastical benefices) and social mobility, above all by 
means of the cathedral chapters. The image is repeated with each of the converso 
agents mentioned. 
Andrés Vela amassed thousands of ducats in ecclesiastical benefices, delivering 
more benefices to his brothers (the priorate of the cathedral of Jaén, a canonry in 
the cathedral of Córdoba, etc.). In an incredible social leap, a few years later his 
nephews entered the ranks of the nobility with the habits of knights in Castile, the 
title of Counts of Vaglio in Naples, and marriages that allowed them to link with 
prominent noble houses (the Italian Carafas, the Spanish Fernández de Córdobas, 
and others).44 
The Torreses shared the prosperous ecclesiastical dignities of archdeacon of 
Vélez and chancellor and dean of the cathedral of Malaga. Simultaneously, they 
formed a true episcopal dynasty in Italy. The various branches of their descendants 
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also would don the habits of knights of military orders, obtain Italian fiefdoms, and 
acquire noble titles such as the Marquisade of Dragonetti-de Torres.45 
The presence in the Curia of António Pinto and his nephew Francisco Vaz 
Pinto assured his brothers and relatives several of the most prominent Portuguese 
prebends (the archdeaconship of Lisbon, the deanship of Oporto, the chancellorship 
of Coimbra, several canonries, and so on), the income of which helped Pinto build 
rich morgados (entailed estates) and become part of the local elite in Portugal. 
The position of Juan Rubio de Herrera as an agent of Naples, Sicily, and Milan 
was expressly reflected on his tombstone in the church of Montserrat in Rome. 
His nephew who commissioned it, the agent Juan de Córdoba, did not hesitate 
to use that position, the accumulated prebends (a half prebend in the cathedral 
of Córdoba, a canonry in Cartagena, etc.) and the associated prestige, to qualify 
his uncle, the son of a New Christian silversmith, as a Cordovan noble (nobili 
cordubensi). He also designed a showy coat of arms for his uncle, a blatant imitation 
of that of the Fernández de Córdobas, lineage of the “the Great Captain” Don 
Gonzalo de Córdoba, conqueror of Naples.46 
The potential of offices such as that of the Crown’s agent presented a temptation 
too great to ignore, and agents, who were often poorly paid or paid late, took advantage 
of them.47 The Crown itself sometimes compensated its agents by allowing such 
practices, which were then criticized by several ambassadors. In a context marked 
by simulation and quid pro quo, many agents ended up establishing ties of interest 
in the Dataria that were sometimes counterproductive to the Crown. This clash of 
interests was a weakness of the system and was constantly denounced. The measures 
taken during Requesens’s embassy in the 1560s were just the first major attempt 
at reform and takeover planned by the Crown. It would be repeated without clear 
success throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.48 However, the vital 
importance of the issuing of apostolic letters for daily life in the Catholic monarchy’s 
territories (in the dynamics of the social mobility of its elites, the rewards relating to 
royal patronage, and so on) made the system of curial agencies both a characteristic 
solution and an irreplaceable apparatus.
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